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NOTES
UNION ARBITRATION, THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT
AND THE REMEDY OF THE INDIVIDUAL
This note will treat generally of individual enforcement of col-
lective bargaining agreements as formulated between an employer
and a union representing his employees. Its scope is narrowed to
an investigation and critique of the position taken by the courts of
the state of New York.1 Two distinct aspects are involved, viz.,
the general power of an individual to bring suit on employment agree-
ments which bind him even though he is not a signatory thereof, and,
the more particular power of individuals to sue under the arbitration
clauses of collective agreements which are enforced pursuant to the
New York Civil Practice Act.2
Judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses in collective bargain-
ing agreements is available only by virtue of the Arbitration Law.
Its various sections validate such clauses,3 authorize motions to com-
pel arbitration,4 to confirm,5 vacate 6 and modify 7 awards made there-
under, and contain other similar regulatory provisions.
The remedies created by the Arbitration Law are available,
either expressly or by necessary implication, only to "parties" to the
controversy being arbitrated.8 The rights of an individual under a
collective bargaining agreement, therefore, rest upon the meaning
given to "parties"-whether the term refers only to signatories of
the agreement, or whether, more broadly, it includes all persons hav-
ing an interest in the outcome of the controversy. Since only the
union and the employer are actual signatories, the first-mentioned
interpretation of "parties" would preclude individual employees from
utilizing the Arbitration Law's provisions.
1 Reference is made to federal legislation and decisions and the decisions
of the courts of sister states only insofar as they may, through comparison
and contrast, aid in reaching a fair understanding and evaluation of the New
York view.
2Article 84, encompassing Civil Practice Act §§ 1448-69, is devoted en-
tirely to provisions bearing on arbitration agreements, and will be referred
to in this article as the Arbitration Law.
3 N.Y. Cnv PRac. Acr § 1448.
4 N.Y. Crv. PRAC. Acr § 1450.
5 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 1461.6 N.Y. Cn PRAc. Acr § 1462.
7 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1462-a.8 See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT § 1462, set out in full, note 14 infra.
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Under the second view, the individual might be said to have a
judicially cognizable beneficial interest in the determination of a
controversy. The courts in New York have, at various times and
for various reasons, adhered to both views.
In 1936, the year in which Barth v. Addie Co.9 was argued,
there seems to have been no doubt but that an individual union mem-
ber was entitled to sue upon a contract between his union and the
employer. There, the plaintiff, an employee and union member,
sought relief against his employer who, in violation of the collective
agreement, caused plaintiff's pay to be reduced. Promptly after com-
mencing his suit on the contract, plaintiff was notified that his em-
ployment was to be terminated altogether. The New York Court of
Appeals, while modifying the amount of the award, unanimously
affirmed the judgment in favor of the employee. The decision is sig-
nificant in that the court sustained the action without questioning
the plaintiff's right to sue.10 It is interesting to note that, as early
as 1914, an employee's right to enforce such an agreement was ex-
pressly granted on the theory that he was a third party beneficiary
to the collective agreement."
While not involving a collective agreement, Busch Jewelry Co. v.
United Retail Employees' Union 12 does construe the meaning of
"parties" as used in the Arbitration Law. There the union and em-
ployer agreed by stipulation to submit their differences to an arbitra-
tion board. A group of nonunion employees, alleging that they and not
the union represented a majority of the employees, moved under
Sections 1462 and 1462-a of the Civil Practice Act to set aside, or
in the alternative, modify, the arbitration award. The motions were
opposed by the union on the ground that nonunion employees were
not such parties to the arbitration proceedings as were envisioned by
the Civil Practice Act, and consequently had no standing before the
court.
9271 N.Y. 31, 2 N.E.2d 34 (1936).
10 The union was subsequently permitted to intervene. Note that both the
union and its member-employee were considered proper parties to the action.
Barth v. Addie Co., 271 N.Y. 31, 34, 2 N.E.2d 34, 35 (1936). The Appellate
Division also unanimously awarded plaintiff damages, without questioning his
right to sue. Barth v. Addie Co., 246 App. Div. 618, 284 N.Y. Supp. 376
(2d Dep't 1935) (memorandum decision).
1 Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 295, 149 N.Y. Supp. 952, 953-54
(3d Dep't 1914). "[T]he defendant had agreed to pay a stated union wage
to the plaintiff and to the other men working with him as members of the
union. The union label had force and value, and the union had strength by
reason of the moneys which it received as fees and dues from the plaintiff
and other members. The plaintiff was therefore connected with the considera-
tion and was a party intended to be benefited by the agreement." Ibid.
12 170 Misc. 482, 10 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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Section 1462-a provides:
In either of the following cases, the court must make an order modifying
or correcting the award, upon the application of any party to the controversy
which was arbitrated:
1. Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an evident
mistake ....
2. Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them ....
3. Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the
merits ....
The order may modify and correct the award so as to effect the intent
thereof and promote justice between the parties.' 3
Section 1462 uses similar language in providing a means of
vacating an arbitration award entirely.14 The court, rejecting the
union's contention, took the following stand as to the rights of indi-
vidual employees under New York's Arbitration Law:
[W]hen the Arbitration Law speaks of "any party to the controversy"
in sections 1462 and 1462-a of the Civil Practice Act, it is obvious that it
refers not only to the parties who have participated in hearings or in the
selection of arbitrators, but to all who are actually parties in interest so far
as the subject matter of arbitration is concerned. If this were not so there
would be no reason for the inclusion of section 1458....1j
Section 1458 provides a remedy for a party who has not partici-
pated in arbitration proceedings but who wishes nevertheless to object
to an award made.' The court in Busch found this section without
meaning or purpose unless it was taken to refer to persons such as
13N.Y. Civ. Pmac. Acr § 1462-a.
'4N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1462: "In either of the following cases, the
court must make an order vacating the award, upon the application of any
party to the controversy which us arbitrated:
1. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means.
2. Where there was evident partiality or corruption ....
3. Where the arbitrators were guilty of ...any ...misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
4. Where the arbitrators ... exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject-matter
submitted was not made.
5. If there was no valid vibnission or contract
15 Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 170 Misc. 482,
485, 10 N.Y.S.2d 519, 521-22 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (emphasis added).
16 N.Y. Crv. PaAc. AcT § 1458(2) : "A party who has not participated in
the selection of the arbitrators or in any of the proceedings had before them
and who has not made or been served with an application to compel arbi-
tration ...may also put in issue the making of the contract or submission
or the failure to comply therewith either by a motion for a stay of the arbi-
tration or in opposition to the confirmation of the award . . . "
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the individual employees before it. From this the court concluded
that article 84 did not limit its remedies to actual parties, or signa-
tories, to the collective agreement but, on the contrary, included all
parties "in interest." A flaw in this reasoning appears, however,
upon noting that section 1458(2), has been utilized extensively in
controversies involving only signatories. 17 Therefore, section 1458
was apparently misconstrued and the validity of the court's conclu-
sion based on that construction consequently becomes questionable.
In the two cases preceding, plaintiffs Barth and Busch enjoyed,
as interested third parties, judicial sympathy for their actions, based
in one instance on an employment contract, and in the other, on the
Arbitration Law. This sympathy is nowhere to be found, however,
just six months after Busch, in Petition of Minasian.s  There, an
employee petitioned under the Arbitration Law to compel arbitration
of a dispute with his employer. 19
The court denied petitioner's motion on two grounds. The first
was that he was barred by laches and the second that, even were he
not so barred, his petition would fail since he had no right, as a
stranger to the contract, to bring any action thereon.20 No mention
was made of section 1450 or of the persons to whom it is available,
but rather the court reasoned in the following manner:
"[A] valid objection to this arbitration is the defective manner
in which it is sought. The contract was between the union and the
employer and a perusal of Schlesinger v. Quinto [21] ... would indi-
cate that the union and not the petitioner should have made the
application." 22
It will be noted that the court apparently placed itself in funda-
mental opposition to Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees'
17 See Matter of Hesslein & Co. v. Greenfield, 281 N.Y. 26, 22 N.E.2d 149
(1939), where the alleged purchaser moved under § 1458(2) to stay arbi-
tration of the controversy between himself and the alleged seller on the
ground that no contract of sale was formed. See also Matter of Amtorg
Trading Corp., 304 N.Y. 519, 109 N.E.2d 606 (1952); Raven Elec. Co. v.
Linzer, 302 N.Y. 188, 97 N.E.2d 746 (1951); Pierce v. Brown Buick, Inc.,
258 App. Div. 679, 17 N.Y.S.2d 889 (2d Dep't), af'd, 283 N.Y. 669, 28 N.E.2d
40 (1940).
is 14 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
"9 Motions to compel arbitration are authorized by N.Y. CIv. PRAc. AcTr
§ 1450: "A party aggrieved by the failure, neglect or refusal of another to
perform under a contract or submission providing for arbitration . . . may
petition the supreme court, or a judge thereof, for an order directing that
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such contract or
submission." (Emphasis added.)
20 Petition of Minasian, 14 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (Sup. Ct. 1939). The court
does not indicate how a plaintiff who was never entitled to sue can be guilty
of laches.
21201 App. Div. 487, 194 N.Y. Supp. 401 (1st Dep't 1922).
22 Petition of Minasian, supra note 20, at 819.
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Union.23  It should be noted further that neither case underwent
appellate review.
The question still had not been finally settled in 1949 when
Matter of I. Miller & Sons 24 expressly discarded Busch and decided
that the Arbitration Law provided relief only for signatories of a
collective agreement. In denying the motion of nonunion employees
to stay arbitration the court made clear its view:
I ... find myself unable to concur in the construction given to these
provisions [Civil Practice Act, Sections 1462 and 1462-a] in the Busch case
* . .as to the right of persons, situated as are the petitioners, to interfere.
Parties to an arbitration are those who have become so by virtue of con-
tract and the submission of a controversy to decision is perforce the agreement
of the parties thereto to arbitrate ....
The phrase "any party to the controversy" . . . refers to one who is a
party to the arbitration agreement and the "controversy" referred to .. .
means the submission of differences that may arise under specified acts or
relations of the parties to the contract .... 25
A notable aspect of Miller is that the court, while denying
third parties' power to intervene in matters of arbitration, suggested
that the result would be different had the petitioners stood in the
shoes of third- party beneficiaries. "Of course, an exception may
attend where the third party claims to be the beneficiary of a contract
to which he is not a party ... ." 26 But if the Arbitration Law is,
as the court holds, available only to "parties," and by "parties" is
meant "signatories," of what significance is it that a movant is a
beneficiary? Moreover, are not nonunion employees, in large meas-
ure, similarly benefited? Certainly the contract provisions pertaining
to wage scales, working hours, and fringe benefits inure as much to
nonunion employees as to union members.
The holding in Matter of Julius Wile Sons & Co.,2 7 introduced,
in 1951, a different approach altogether. There, a union refused to
23 Simply stated, the point of opposition is this: two similarly situated
plaintiffs, moving under the same statute (article 84), obtained opposite re-
sults. The employees of Busch were held to be proper parties plaintiff;
Minasian was declared powerless as a stranger to the arbitration.
24 195 Misc. 20, 88 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
25 Id. at 24, 88 N.Y.S.2d at 576. The court rejected petitioners' motion
on the further ground that §§ 1462 and 146 2-a provide for an attack on an
arbitration award and are inapplicable in petitioners' case because no award
has been made. Id. at 23, 8 N.Y.S.2d at 576. This does not affect this dis-
cussion, however, since § 1450 enables a party to compel arbitration, and § 1451
authorizes a stay in proceedings violating an arbitration agreement. Thus,
had petitioners moved under either of these sections, the court's argument
regarding the absence of an award against which to move, would not apply.
There can be no doubt, nevertheless, that because of their disability as non-
parties, no motion by petitioners would have been granted.
26Id. at 23, 88 N.Y.S.2d at 575; cf. Barth v. Addie Co., 271 N.Y. 31,
2 N.E.2d 34 (1936) (see text accompanying note 9 supra).
27 199 Misc. 654, 102 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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arbitrate a nonunion employee's dispute with his employer. The em-
ployee then brought an action against the employer alleging breach
of contract. That action was stayed, on motion by the employer,
pending arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
with the union. No such arbitration was forthcoming. In answer
to the employee's motion to vacate the stay, the court directed that
the employee and employer seek to arbitrate the controversy without
enlisting the union's participation. The court further directed that
if such plan proved unworkable, then the employee would be per-
mitted to proceed with his action at law. In view of the discussion
to this point, the Wile case stands alone. No question was there
raised as to the individual's authority to merely affect the arbitration:
on the contrary, he was directed to depose and displace the union
wholly, and to proceed in total disregard of the union's rights under
the contract.
The court's sympathy was clearly with the slighted employee:
I do not think that the ... [employee] must be made the unwilling victim
of this impasse [viz., the union's refusal to arbitrate, and the stay in the
employee's action at law pending arbitration]. It is clear that he is entitled
to have his claim against petitioner . . . heard and determined .... 28
It was thus "clear" to the court that an individual is entitled to
seek enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement. This same
point was "obvious" to the court in Busch, but was flatly denied in
Miller, as was a similar contention in Petition of Minasian.
In the decade following the Wile case the courts of New York
continued to render inconsistent opinions concerning the rights of
employees. The cases discussed thus far are representative of a
large number of decisions which in some instances upheld 29 and in
others denied 3o the individual's claimed right to a personal remedy.
28 Id. at 655, 102 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
29 See, e.g., Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E.2d
227 (1954) (memorandum decision) (Individual employee may attack arbitra-
tion award by motion to vacate pursuant to §§ 1462 and 1463 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act.) ; Hudak v. Hornell Indus., Inc., 304 N.Y. 207, 106 N.E.2d 609 (1952)(employees permitted to assert rights under collective bargaining agreement
since they were third party beneficiaries); Iroquois Beverage Corp. v. Inter-
national Union, 14 Misc. 2d 290, 159 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (Where it
appears that individual employees will not be fairly represented by the union
during arbitration proceedings, such employees may intervene.).
30 See, e.g., Wright v. Ruppert, 14 Misc. 2d 290, 182 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct.
1953) (Individual acting in bad faith has no right to compel arbitration where
representative union denies that he has a valid complaint. Agreement is be-
tween union and employer and the power to enforce it rests solely in those
parties.); Bianculli v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 115 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct.
1952) (Individual under collective bargaining agreement had no right to compel
arbitration by union or to require employer to submit to arbitration not par-
ticipated in by union. Union alone has right to arbitrate employee's grievance.) ;
Sholgen v. Lipsett, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (Individual, not
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An end to the controversy came in 1959 when the Court of
Appeals in Parker v. Borock 31 expressly limited the employee's rem-
edy to an action against his union. There, the employee, having
been discharged, first employed the grievance procedure outlined in
the collective agreement. Representatives of both the company and
the union discussed the discharge, but it was agreed that no wrong 3 2
had been done. The plaintiff, consequently, was not reinstated. The
union specifically refused a request by the plaintiff that the matter
be pressed to arbitration. He then brought an action against his
employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
In dismissing plaintiff's cause, the court rested upon its inter-
pretation of the collective agreement which declared the agreement to
be binding on the employer, the union, its officers, representatives,
and members. Provisions to this effect are standard in such agree-
ments.3 3  Under it, concludes the court, the provisions of the col-
lective agreement inure to the union members.3 4 They are expressly
bound by it, in all of its provisions, including the fundamental clause
empowering the union to process all grievances. The plaintiff, there-
fore, can obtain relief only insofar as the union is willing to act in
his behalf. "[T]he only conclusion which logically follows is that
the employee is without any remedy, except as against his own union,
if he claims that the union mishandled [his grievance]. . . ., 35
being a party to a collective bargaining agreement, may not demand arbitration
thereunder.); DeRienzo v. Farrand Optical Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1956).
31 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959).
32 The agreement provided that no regular employee could be discharged
or disciplined without good and sufficient cause. It was upon an alleged breach
of this clause that plaintiff based his action.
3 See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp., 1 C.C.H. LAB. L. REp. (Union Contracts
Arbitration) 159,908, p. 85,204 (1960); Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 1 C.C.H.
LAB. L. REP. (Union Contracts Arbitration) 1159,911, p. 85,352; Consolidated
Edison of N.Y., 1 C.C.H. LAB. L. REP. (Union Contracts Arbitration) 1 59,920,
p. 85,852-53; Ford Motor Co., 1 C.C.H. LAB. L. REP. (Union Contracts Arbitra-
tion) 159,923, p. 86,005; Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 1 C.C.H. LAB. L. REP.
(Union Contracts Arbitration) 59,927, p. 86,252. It should be observed that
the collective agreement provisions naming the union as sole and exclusive
barga.ning agent (the essential clause), in effect declare the employees bound
to submit all disputes and grievances under the agreement to the union for
processing. In this sense, all employees are bound by collective agreements,
whether the contract so recites or not.
34 Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 161, 156 N.E.2d 297, 299, 182 N.Y.S.2d
577, 581 (1959).
35 Id. at 161, 156 N.E.2d at 300, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 581. In a dictum state-
ment, the court declared: "In this jurisdiction, it is clear that wage provisions
in the collective bargaining agreement inure to the direct benefit of employees
and may be the subject of a cause of action." Id. at 159, 156 N.E.2d at 298,
182 N.Y.S.2d at 577. In light of the court's final holding, this statement
appears to be without real meaning. The court agrees that the union is the
sole bargaining agent in disputes arising under the collective agreement. Wage
disputes therefore would necessarily be a union responsibility.
1960] NOTES
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While in Parker v. Borock, denial of the employee's cause of
action was based upon an interpretation of the collective agreement
itself, Matter of Soto 36 accomplished the same result, in 1960, under
its interpretation of Arbitration Law provisions.37 In Soto, the plain-
tiff moved to vacate an arbitration award, 38 which permitted his dis-
charge, on the ground that he was denied representation by his own
attorney in the arbitration proceeding and that the attorney assigned
by the union to act in his behalf was in fact an attorney who in
related matters acted also as counsel for the employer.
Reversing a unanimous decision of the Appellate Division,"0 the
court found that the petitioner was not a proper party plaintiff:
The award . . . could be vacated only at the initiation of a party to the
arbitration . . . . The misconduct of an arbitrator, contemplated by the
statute, and warranting the setting aside of an award, is that "by which the
rights of any party have been. prejudiced" . . . . The petitioners, not bein-
parties to the agreement may not avail themselves of rights which under the
Civil Practice Act are limited to parties; an exception to such limitation may
not be created by judicial application of equitable principles, nor may a basis
for vacatur be supplied by implication. 40
Taken together, Parker v. Borock and Matter of Soto preclude
the assertion by an individual employee in New York of any claim
arising under a collective bargaining agreement. 41 Parker, in effect,
denies employees any right of action on the contract; 42 Soto denies
the privilege of invoking, or in any way affecting, the arbitration
procedure.43
367 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960).
3 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1462(3): "[T]he court must make an order
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the controversy which
was arbitrated: .... 3. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced."38 N.Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 1462 (3).
39 Matter of Soto, 7 App. Div.2d 1, 180 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1959).
40 Matter of Soto, 7 N.Y.2d 397, 399, 165 N.E.2d 855, 856, 198 N.Y.S.2d
282, 283 (1960).
41 With the indirect exception, of course, of an action in tort against a
union for breach of a fiduciary duty owing to the employee.
42 This does not necessarily prevent an employee from joining in proceed-
ings instituted either by the union or the employer. Sections 193-a and 193-b
of the Civil Practice Act, relating to third party practice, provide for par-
ticipation in any action by interested persons, either as plaintiffs or defendants.
These sections have been held applicable to arbitration proceedings, although no
specific reference is made to individual union members. See Publisher's Ass'n
v. Typographical Union, 168 Misc. 267, 5 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
However, since the Court of Appeals in Matter of Soto denied relief to an
individual under the Arbitration Law, it is not likely that it will reverse itself
in the face of Civil Practice Act provisions only remotely concerned with
arbitration procedures.
43 While Matter of Soto specifically interpreted only §§ 1462 and 14 62 -a
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The United States Supreme Court, through implication and dicta
in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp.,44 strongly implied that the federal courts are similarly
unavailable to individuals. There, it was held that not even a union
acting in behalf of its members may bring an action under Section
301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act45 for an alleged breach of wage
provisions in a collective agreement. The Court disallowed the suit,
stating that if unions were to avail themselves of section 301(a) in
the enforcement of every personal wrong committed against each of
its members, a tide of litigation would result that could not have been
intended by Congress.40  In view of this, it is not likely that the
Supreme Court would allow individuals to pursue suits of the very
same character on their own behalf.
In Dimteco v. Fischer,4T plaintiff-workman brought suit under
section 301(a) against his employer for wrongful discharge, and
against his union for failure to properly represent him under the
arbitration clause of a collective agreement. The District Court held
this provision unavailable to individuals, first, because a remedy is
available to them, even at common law, in the courts of various
states,48 and further, because allowance of actions by disgruntled in-
dividuals would seriously overburden the courts.4 9 This position is
reflective of the very wide majority of federal decisions in point.50
The Court in Westinghouse also lent strength to the Dimneco
view that individuals ought confine themselves to remedies already
of the Civil Practice Act, it is most likely that the meaning of "parties" will
be construed uniformly throughout article 84, so closely meshed and inter-
dependent are the sections therein. It is hardly probable, for example, that
an individual's motion to compel arbitration under § 1450 would be granted,
and his subsequent motion to confirm the award under § 1461 denied.
44 348 U.S. 437 (1954).45 "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organ-
ization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, with-
out respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship
of the parties." Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)§301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
46 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 148 U.S. 437, 459-61 (1954).
47 185 F. Supp. 213 (D.N.J. 1960).
48 Id. at 215.
50 See, e.g., United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997
(7th Cir. 1952); Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Columbia Typographical
Union, 124 F. Supp. 322 (D.D.C. 1954); Square D Corp. v. United Elec.
Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Mich. 1954) ; Disanti v. Local 53, Federation
of Glass Workers, 126 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. Pa. 1954) ; Ketcher v. Sheet Metal
Workers, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1953) ; Schatte v. International Alliance
of Theatrical Stage Employees, 84 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949), aff'd, 182
F.2d 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950). But cf. Massanzano
v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 184 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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available in state forums: "The employees have always been able
to enforce their individual rights in the state courts." 51 Thus, the
Court reasoned that at a time when Congress was concerned with
congestion in the federal courts, it could not have contemplated a
broadening of federal jurisdiction to include remedies already avail-
able in state courts.
The availability of a remedy in state courts as a consideration
warranting a narrow interpretation of section 301 (a) is, in light of
Parker v. Borock, small comfort to workers in New York. What-
ever may be the remedies allowed in other states,5 2 the narrow view
of section 301 (a) probably forecloses New York employees from
bringing suit in the one remaining forum available to them.
It will be noted that section 301 has been thus interpreted osten-
sibly on the basis of congressional intent. The following excerpt is
taken from the debate concerning section 301 prior to passage in
the House of Representatives:
Mr. Barden. Mr. Chairman, I take this time for the purpose of asking
the Chairman a question, and in asking the question I want it to be under-
stood that it is intended to make a part of the record that may hereafter be
referred to as history of the legislation.
It is my understanding that section [301] . . . contemplates not only the
ordinary lawsuits for damages but also such other remedial proceedings, both
legal and equitable, as might be appropriate in the circumstances; in other
words, proceedings could, for example, be brought by the employers, the labor
organizations, or interested individual employees under the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act in order to secure declarations from the Court of legal rights under
the contract.
Mr. Hartley.[ 53] The interpretation the gentleman has just given of that
section is absolutely correct.5 4
So clear an expression of congressional intent is not frequently
available. It is difficult to understand how, in the face of it, the
courts are able to attribute to Congress an intent directly opposed
to that which it has specifically declared.
51 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., su pra note 46, at 460.
52 Most other states apparently do allow suits by individual employees. See,
e.g., Mastell v. Salo, 140 Ark. 408, 215 S.W. 583 (1919); O'Jay Spread Co.
v. Hicks, 185 Ga. 507, 195 S.E. 564 (1938); McGregor v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
244 Ky. 696, 51 S.W.2d 953 (1932); Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Sideboard,
161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931); Hall v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 224
Mo. App. 431, 28 S.W.2d 687 (1930); Rentscehler v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934) ; H. Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App.
426, 155 N.E. 154 (1926); Volquardsin v. Southern Amusement Co., 156 So.
678 (La. App. 1934); Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461,
9 S.W.2d 692 (1928).
53 Mr. Hartley was the sponsor of the act in the House of Representatives.
5493 CONG. REc. 3656-57 (1947) (emphasis added).
NOTES
Unions are formed essentially to equalize the imbalance of power
between employers and individuals, and to serve as instruments in
a continuing effort to isolate and more accurately define the preroga-
tives of labor and to increase their number. The union organization
is a child of human need, and as such, serves well only while that
need is being effectively met. Thus, while unions are properly rec-
ognized as entities separate and distinct from the individuals within
them for most purposes, the separation must not be permitted to be-
come so broad that sight is lost of individual rights.
Yet Matter of Soto 55 declares that the individual employee is
a total stranger to the collective agreement and that when the Arbi-
tration Law gives remedy to aggrieved "parties to the controversy"
it does not include thereby, the very person for whom the union
acts; the person who, in most cases, is the only party directly affected,
and who, in all cases of personal grievance, is the party with the
greatest interest. Such a position reflects a widespread tendency to
give to unions an existence too far removed from the individuals
they purport to serve.
The proper extent of union power is not easily delimited, how-
ever. Allowance of individual action in all controversies obviously
would result in complete breakdown of the arbitration concept as an
efficient, inexpensive and consistent method of settling labor disputes.
The union is peculiarly competent to act both for individual employees
and for all employees as a group, whether the action taken is the
processing of single grievances, invoking arbitration or prosecuting
actions at law on the contract. 56 For example, many settlements
in individual cases are made with a view toward the effect they will
have as precedents bearing on future controversies. Thus, a union
may decline to press a valid grievance because a present settlement
in the individual's favor will result in unfavorable settlements of a
large number of grievances at later dates. A union, therefore, must
weigh comparative advantages so that the interests of a majority of
the employees will be served.57
Manifestly, such decisions involve considerable discretion.
[I]f the entire nexus of the individual's right is subject to determination
by the Union or a Union committee, there is the danger that his individual
rights may . . . be used for trading purposes in bargaining with management,
or that their vindication may depend on his position in the Union or his per-
sonal relations with the committee members.58
5 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855, 198 N.Y.S2d 282 (1960).56 See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreenwnt, 69 HARv. L. REV. 601, 625-27
(1956).
57Id. at 614-15.58 In re Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co., 100 F. Supp. 706, 711 (D. Conn.
1951); cf. Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 127
N.Y.S.2d 709 (3d Dep't 1954).
1960]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The law in New York seems to place individual workers entirely
at the mercy of union management, denying them remedy under the
collective agreement however flagrant such abuses of discretion might
be. As has been indicated, the aggrieved party is relegated to an
action at law against the union for damages.
The individual is thus forced to bear the expense of litigation
and the burden of proving fraud or breach of fiduciary duty in deal-
ings admittedly of a discretionary nature, and in which, in the usual
instance, he has taken little active part. Further, should he overcome
these obstacles, he is entitled only to money damages-a remedy not
wholly satisfactory in instances of, for example, wrongful discharge.
The door of abuse would seem therefore to be cast ajar in an
area that has already had occasion to feel the sting of power
misused.59
The need seems clear then for precise regulation of enforcement
procedures under collective agreements that would preserve the basic
rights of individuals to remedy injustices done them and at the same
time retain the overall advantages of the collective bargaining system.
Such regulation, properly, is the task of the legislature.
An amendment to the Civil Practice Act permitting the indi-
vidual to compel and otherwise affect arbitration proceedings be-
tween the parties, upon a showing that there is reasonable cause
to believe that the employee's rights have been violated by the union's
mismanagement of his grievance, would seem to be the most likely
solution. Such an amendment (if possible in the now-existing statu-
tory scheme) would tend to limit direct participation in arbitration
proceedings to those individuals whose rights are clearly endangered.
Neither a flood of litigation nor the consequent collapse of the arbi-
tration system, so feared by the courts, seems likely under such a
provision.
FEDERAL INCOME AND NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY CHARITABLE
TAX EXEMPTIONS: APPLICATION OF THE "EXCLUSIVE" TEST
The problem herein discussed is one of comparative statutory
construction, centering around the meaning of "exclusive," as used
in Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and Section 420
59 See, e.g., Gregory, Fiduciary Standards and the Bargaining and Grievance
Process, 8 LAB. L.J. 843 (1947) ; Kennedy, Union Refusal to Bargain, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 502 (1958); Tureen, Judicial Intervention in Intra-Union Affairs to
Protect the Rights of Members, 1954 WAsn. L.Q. 440 (1954).
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